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Abstract
This essay argues that when there is a moral duty to procreate, 
nonprocreators owe assistance in the task of providing for children, even 
if their presence renders nonprocreators worse off. When new children 
bring benefits to nonprocreators, they have a duty of reciprocity owed to 
cooperating parents. If there is a moral duty to provide meaningful work 
opportunities, especially to the worse off, we have special duties to help 
poor people enjoy opportunities for the meaningful work of raising children. 
Given the benefits of stable families for both their adult and  child members, 
justice requires facilitating the enjoyment of stable faily life by poor people.
 
Keywords: Procreative duties, reciprocity, meaningful work, marriage 
promotion, social justice. 
1. INTRODUCTION 1
Women in economically advanced societies and in some other locales have 
gained increased opportunities to participate in the market economy and 
public life in the past century. 2 These gains are undeniably great advances 
in social justice. They have been accompanied by strains. It’s unlikely that so 
far we have anywhere evolved the right mix of institutional adjustments and 
changes in social norms and practices to facilitate the transition to a world 
in which men and women contribute on equal terms in the labor market 
and the entrepreneurial arena.
In this essay I try to offer a perspective on what we owe to poor families 
in the context of recent social changes, especially women’s increasing 
participation in economic life outside the home. 3 “Poor families” refers 
to adults and children living in a household with low income and wealth, 
1. For helpful comments and criticism I thank Serena Olsaretti and Andrew Williams. 
2. Fuchs 1988; also Esping-Andersen 2009. 
3. Although my discussion stays at an abstract level above social policy choice, I suspect 
my thinking tends to focus on U.S. problems and circumstances. On the differences between 
welfare state policy in the U.S. and in Europe, see Garfkinkel et al., 2010; also Alesina and 
Glaezer 2004. 
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roughly the bottom quintile. “We” refers to the nonpoor. 4 Of course what 
we owe to people we fundamentally owe to individual persons not groups; 
focus on families is a heuristic for public policy guidance.
Offering a perspective is here a distinct and separate enterprise from 
assessing candidate fundamental moral principles. The aim is to identify 
appealing mid-level norms that might gain wide allegiance among people 
who differ in their fundamental moral allegiances. Offering a perspective 
is also distinct and separate from advancing public policy proposals. In 
order to be in a position to advance and defend a specific public policy 
proposal, one needs to be able to show that if implemented in our actual 
circumstances the policy would lead to outcomes that are morally desirable 
(without violating moral constraints). Doing that requires a comprehensive 
empirical understanding of relevant actual circumstances to which this 
essay does not aspire.
My procedure is to suggest how to think about how to fulfill our obligations 
to people in disadvantaged families on the assumption that what we owe 
to others by way of cooperating on fair terms or lending a helping hand 
depends on what policies would do to help people live genuinely better 
lives, have richer and more fulfilled lives rather than bleak or squalid ones. 
John Rawls once wrote that his proposed theory of justice, justice as 
fairness, does not look behind the uses that people make of their resources 
and opportunities in order to measure, much less maximize, the satisfactions 
they gain (Rawls 1993). Provided basic institutions are arranged so that 
the distribution of resources and opportunities turns out to be fair, what 
individuals do with their resources and what quality of life they fashion for 
themselves is their business, not the business of society. So Rawls urges. In 
contrast, I assume that determining what policies would be fair requires 
us always to be looking past the distribution of liberties and opportunities 
to see what impact the policies are having on the quality of the lives of the 
individuals who are affected. (The fact that’s what just and fair depends on 
what’s good in this way is fully compatible with paying attention to personal 
responsibility in the all-things-considered determination of morally 
desirable policy.)
I do not attempt to come up with a complete set of norms regulating 
what we owe to poor families. I urge that when a poor person becomes the 
parent of a child and is willing to assume childrearing responsibilities for 
that child, the rest of us acquire strong obligations to help bring it about 
4. For the most part I confine my attention to relations between poor and nonpoor in a 
single political society. This scope restriction sets aside duties that people have to poor people 
anywhere, and at any time, regardless of who inhabits what society. This is just a simplification 
for purposes of discussion; I don’t in fact believe people within a single political society owe 
more to fellow members than to outsiders. 
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that the child starts adult life well socialized and with good prospects. In 
one range of cases, the new child expectedly depletes available resources 
and hence her arrival renders the rest of us worse off. Nonetheless, the 
persons responsible for bringing the child into existence may be acting to 
fulfill a moral obligation that falls collectively on each generation to “be 
fruitful, and multiply” and that places duties on each member individually 
to contribute a fair share to the project of procreation and childrearing and 
adequate provisioning. The extent of what is owed depends on the amount 
of burden that childbearing and childrearing place on procreators and in 
part on the amount of burden that helping more or helping less would place 
on others. In another range of cases, an additional moral obligation falls on 
nonprocreators. When the addition of a new child to the world expectedly 
leads to increase of wealth and culture and tends to make those living in 
the vicinity of the new child better off, the project of childbearing and 
childrearing is morally comparable to a beneficial cooperative practice and 
those who benefit from the operation of the practice are duty bound not to 
free ride on the cooperative efforts of others but rather to contribute their 
fair share of the burdens of the practice.
An additional consideration that generates a duty on the part of the 
nonpoor to aid the childrearing efforts of poor parents is that for people 
whose labor market prospects are poor, the opportunity to raise children is 
a very significant, perhaps the only feasible opportunity they have to engage 
in creative and fulfilling work. In this situation, assisting people to undertake 
and successfully complete a parenting project may be a requirement of 
distributive justice owed to them.
Finally, and tentatively, I suggest that people have a defeasible moral right 
to stable nurturing family arrangements. Children have a right to a decent 
home environment. Adults have rights to freedom to date and mate on 
mutually agreeable terms, and a right to a social environment that facilitates 
successful steady family arrangements. Such a social environment will 
educate youth to be disposed to seek long-term steady family arrangements 
and to have the skills and personal traits needed for success in this venture. 
These family-oriented rights and obligations do not negate the entitlements 
to fair treatment of those who will avoid family entanglements as adults, 
but these entitlements properly construed are consistent with society’s 
implementing policies and promoting norms that nudge individuals toward 
stable nurturing family arrangements.
2. DUTIES TO PROCREATORS
When a poor person has a child, what, if anything, is owed to the childbearer 
in virtue of this event? Let’s back up. When any person has a child, what, if 
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anything, is owed to the childbearer in virtue of this event?
A robust libertarianism holds that the new child has a right to decent 
prospects in life, but that the duty to supply these decent prospects falls only 
on the individuals responsible for bringing this child into existence and on 
no one else. A variant of this view holds that the duty to care for a child falls 
in the first instance only on these responsible individuals, and duties fall on 
others only as a second-best back-up responsibility that comes into play only 
if the responsible procreators fail to do what they ought. This is a possible 
view, but here I set it aside without comment (Steiner and Vallentyne 2009).
Suppose instead that we all have a duty to do our fair share to help provide 
each new child with decent life prospects. That means that nonprocreators 
have a duty to contribute to fair shares for children under conditions of full 
compliance (when procreators are contributing what they ought to give). But 
we might wonder what is a fair division of this burden across the procreators 
of the child and everyone else. After all, in the standard case, those who bring 
a child into existence either engage in sex with the aim of producing a child 
or engage in sex with the understanding that a possible outcome of what they 
are doing is that a new child might be brought into existence. So maybe the 
procreators bear some special responsibility in this regard.
This issue is insightfully analyzed in a resource egalitarian framework 
by Paula Casal and Andrew Williams (Casal and Williams 2004). Other 
philosophers inspired by the resource egalitarianism of Ronald Dworkin 
adopt similar views. 5 They contrast two possible cases. In one case, bringing 
a child into existence makes others better off, by increasing the supply of 
resources available for humans to use. In another possible case, bringing 
a child into existence makes others worse off, by decreasing the supply 
of resources available for humans to use. One can discern an asymmetry 
between the cases. When people voluntarily choose to have children, to the 
point that there is no undersupply, with resulting benefits to others, we who 
benefit from the parents’ childbearing and childrearing efforts do not owe 
compensation to the parents for this benefit. This is a positive externality 
and those who benefit from it do not thereby incur any obligation towards 
those who produce it to reward them for doing so. In contrast, when people 
voluntarily choose to have children, and thereby make others worse off, there 
is a moral case for requiring the responsible procreators to pay the costs their 
childbearing generates and not seek to impose these costs on nonprocreators.
To illustrate, suppose society begins with a group of adults forming a 
society with a supply of unowned resources available for fair distribution 
among them. No one has prior claims on the resources. The resources 
should then be divided fairly among the individuals. Following the resource 
5. See, for example, Rakowski 1993; also Clayton 2006. 
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egalitarian views of Ronald Dworkin, Casal and Williams suppose a fair 
distribution is the one that mimics the outcome of an equal auction in 
which all resources are put up for bid and the individuals are given equal 
bidding power (equal money for use in the auction) and there is trade to 
equilibrium, with the added proviso that there are also simultaneously in 
play hypothetical insurance markets for handicaps and native marketable 
talents. 6 Individuals as they bid for resources are also able to purchase 
insurance against suffering handicaps, with the overall incidence of 
handicaps known but not the particular risk that one has one or several, 
and able to purchase insurance against having low marketable talent. In this 
hypothetical market one knows one’s native talents but not what prices they 
are likely to fetch when the auction ends and economic life commences. The 
insurance pays out if one has the covered condition and one pays into the 
fund that makes these payments if one lacks the condition against which one 
has insured. To simplify, assume the outcome of the hypothetical auction 
and insurance markets is that all of the individuals receive an equal share of 
available material resources.
Now suppose some people voluntarily act so that a new child is brought 
into the world, and suppose the existence of this child will lessen not 
increase the available stock of resources. Suppose that as each new child 
enters the world, each is owed an equal resource share as defined by the 
hypothetical auction and insurance market procedures, and just suppose 
the outcome continues to be that each new person should get an equal share 
of available resources. The existing adults must together then be worse off, 
must accept fewer resources, to satisfy the just claim of the new child. Who 
should bear this cost? Casal and Williams point out in effect that if we start 
from a fair initial distribution and there is a fair framework for interaction 
after that (roughly, a standard private ownership free market economy with 
the requirement that one not harm others without their consent), then those 
and only those who have voluntarily brought about the child should pay for 
the costs the child’s entry into the world imposes on others. 
From the perspective of the nonprocreators, the cost of the new child 
created by others is bad brute luck, luck that falls on them beyond their 
power to control. 7 This luck merits full compensation. In contrast, the cost 
of the new child in its relation to the child’s voluntary creators is option luck, 
costs brought about that they should have foreseen and might have avoided. 
There is a case then for requiring the procreators to absorb the costs of the 
new child, including the costs of giving the child resources to enable her to 
have fair initial prospects should fall on the procreators and no one else. In 
6. Dworkin 2000, chapters 1 and 2; also Dworkin 2011, chapter 16. See also Steiner 1995.
7. The claim in the text here is advanced by Rakowski, not by Casal and Williams. On the 
distinction between brute luck and option luck, see Dworkin 2000. See also Vallentyne 2002.
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this respect having children is like building a fire on your property for your 
own purposes that emits pollution that fouls the air that others must absorb. 
These costs imposed by your voluntary conduct should be borne by you and 
no one else, so you owe full compensation to those your behavior would 
otherwise be harming, in the absence of this full compensation. As in the 
pollution case, we suppose that it is morally permissible for agents to act with 
their resources for their own purposes in ways that have spillover negative 
effects on others (unless there are special circumstances such as that the 
negative effects are noncompensable) if and only if they fully compensate 
others for any damages incurred.
It bears emphasis that Casal and Williams are assuming background 
conditions of fair distribution of resources. Their analysis and assessment 
would not straightforwardly apply to a world like ours in which the distribution 
of resources over time fails to conform to the resource egalitarian justice 
principles. So their analysis and assessment does not straightforwardly 
yield any implications for what we might owe voluntary procreators who 
bring costly children into existence and what they might owe us when social 
relations are already marred by distributive injustice.
There is some plausibility to the account that Casal and Williams provide. 
However, the view they offer is incomplete and thus defective. Let us look at 
the two cases they consider.
2.1. Case One: Procreation Imposes Costs on Nonprocreators
To see the difficulty, imagine a world with very low population. This might 
be the situation in a world shortly after the events of the Adam and Eve story 
as told in the Judeo-Christian Bible have unfolded. Or we might imagine 
a world with very reduced population in the wake of some natural or 
man-made disaster such as a war that wipes out almost the entire human 
population and sets us the task of starting human society afresh. Suppose 
there are four individuals and resources are initially divided fairly in line with 
the hypothetical equal auction and insurance markets. Again, to simplify, 
just suppose the fair distribution is an equal distribution. Each individual 
gets one-quarter of the Earth’s material resources. The four individuals then 
proceed to save and consume and build with the resources they own. They 
trade with each other on mutually agreed terms. All is well, as assessed from 
the resource egalitarian perspective.
Now imagine that two of the individuals pair up and have two children. 
This addition of new people might over time reduce or increase the 
resources available for human use; let us suppose there is a reduction. In 
these circumstances, the new individuals have a right to a fair initial share 
of resources; let us suppose this is a share of resources equal to what each 
of the four initial persons received. Here the resource egalitarian position 
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yields the clear result that the two procreators and they alone should bear 
the cost of introducing the new people into the world and providing them 
fair initial shares.
This result seems clearly mistaken. Or at least, an issue needs to be 
faced, to settle who owes whom what in this setting. In effect Rakowski’s 
assessment of the situation assumes that the resource endowments that the 
four people initially get are lifetime entitlements come what may. The four 
are in effect lords and ladies of the Earth, entitled to all of it, fairly divided. 
There would be no moral impropriety if the four all lived out their lives as 
nonprocreators and the total population of the Earth after the start of our 
account turns out to be four. Each might say, “One-fourth of the Earth is 
mine, to use as I choose”.
But someone might protest that each person’s initial endowment of 
resources only provisionally belongs to him. Each is a partial steward of 
the Earth, with a responsibility to pass it on intact, or perhaps to pass along 
some combination of material resources plus technology so that future 
generations of people get fair shares and decent life prospects. Moreover, 
there is a responsibility of some sort bearing on each of us to bring it about 
the future generations exist. There is a moral duty falling on the four initial 
owners to bring about future people.
I would add, there is a duty not simply to maintain current population 
but, as the biblical injunction says, to “be fruitful, and multiply”. 8 Exactly 
what the correct secular version of the biblical injunction requires would 
involve elaborating a full population ethics, which I am not able to do. But 
even without having in hand a full population ethics, we can see some of 
its contours, and can say with assurance that when the Earth can sustain 
increasing population with good lives for people, it is not morally permissible 
for existing people to decline to reproduce and let the human race die out. 
Nor for that matter would it be morally permissible merely to sustain a very 
low population, as in our toy example. Here I am appealing to a vague but 
controversial premise, which those who oppose the claim that nonparents 
owe help to those who voluntarily create costly children may reject. However, 
rejection comes at a cost. If the resources of the Earth are abundant, or can 
predictably support a very large population for the indefinite future given 
predictable improvements in technology that render natural resources 
increasingly useful, many will agree with me that it is wrong for us to fail to 
produce the population increase that can bring huge gains in lives worth 
living. 9
Of course there are some ways in which the addition of new people to 
the world might worsen the prospects of already existing people that would 
8. The Book of Genesis 1: 28.
9. For a view contrary to what is asserted in the text, see Narveson 1967. 
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plausibly be regarded as trampling on their genuine rights. Suppose the story 
of how adding new people worsens the existing people’s life prospects is that 
we procreators culpably mismanage the education and socialization of our 
children and they grow up to be antisocial, disposed to engage in acts that 
wrongfully harm others. If this is the way that the already existing people’s 
life prospects are made worse off by the addition of new people, the already 
existing nonprocreators may have a plausible case that the procreators have 
done them wrong. (I say “may have a case”, putting the claim tentatively, 
because we have yet to see what responsibilities nonprocreators might have 
regarding the education and socialization of new people.)
But simply being made worse off by the arrival of new people on Earth 
because one has to share the Earth with them, given that their arrival was 
beyond one’s power to control, and brought about by the actions of others, 
does not introduce a justice claim of nonprocreators against responsible 
procreators. To see whether any such entitlement of nonprocreators is 
violated, we need to look at the duties and obligations that we all have with 
respect to childbearing.
I have suggested that there is a collective duty to be fruitful and multiply, 
a duty that falls on all of us together to bring about sufficient population 
growth or maintenance (or reduction, in unfortunate circumstances). This 
collective duty generates individual duties, but in a conditional and indirect 
way. Consider by way of analogy the duty that falls on an enormous crowd 
of people lying around at the beach, to carry out a rescue when someone 
falls in peril of drowning. There is a duty initially that falls on each of us 
to carry out a rescue if no one else does so, a duty that disappears when 
someone able to carry out the rescue commences it. The collective duty then 
is transmuted into a duty to provide help to the rescue team if that is needed, 
and to compensate for the costs they incur and the services they render, 
and to participate in follow-up efforts to help the imperiled person recover 
from the near-drowning incident either by contributing labor directly or by 
contributing to a fund of resources used for these amelioration efforts.
We need not enter into the abstract question, what theory of morality 
best explains and justifies the particular shape that the duty to rescue 
that binds us has. Suffice it to say that according to any moral theory that 
stands a chance of being right, morality contains a significant beneficence 
requirement—a requirement to make the world better by one’s efforts. The 
beneficence requirement may be multifaceted, but it is plausible to insist 
that it includes a requirement to contribute to making the world better by 
bringing the number of people who enjoy good life prospects closer to what 
it should ideally be.
In the context of the initial situation of four people living on Earth, 
a resource egalitarian view might initially assign each of us provisional 
ownership of one-quarter of the Earth’s material resources. But this is not a 
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permanent bequeathable property right over the entirety of those resources. 
Nor is it a full property right that disappears only with one’s death, as the 
example we are considering illustrates. The initial distribution of resources 
takes place against a moral background in which population growth is 
mandatory and there is an obligation to share resources with new people 
whether or not the addition of the new people worsens one’s situation 
compared to what it would have been had no new people arrived on the 
scene. That is not a morally relevant baseline of comparison because one 
never has any right to enjoy throughout one’s life an undisturbed ownership 
of the equal share of resources that is implemented at an earlier time on the 
ground that it is fair to then existing individual persons.
So in my example the procreators are fulfilling a collective duty binding 
on all existing people, and nonprocreators are obligated to contribute to this 
mission to some degree, even if population increase takes away from their 
initial endowment of resources, where the initial allocation of these resources 
is assumed to be (provisionally) fair. At a minimum the nonprocreators are 
obligated to accept this reduction in their resources that we are supposing 
accompanies the morally mandatory population increase. 
Notice that the resource reduction accompanying population increase 
that according to Casal and Williams triggers a duty on the part of 
procreators to make good this loss to nonprocreators (or prevent it from 
ever occurring by absorbing themselves the costs of giving their children 
fair initial shares) need not even involve any worsening of the lives of the 
nonprocreators all things considered. The presence of the new humans 
might be pleasurable for everyone to contemplate. Watching children frolic 
is fun. Hence the population increase might leave no one sad that this event 
has occurred, without this fact counting against the Casal-Williams claim of 
the nonprocreators to full compensation for resource losses. This feature of 
their view is generated by its being resource-oriented, not welfare-oriented.
The position I am sketching regarding procreation obligations need 
not deny that special responsibilities fall on the particular persons who 
voluntarily act to produce childbirth. These persons have brought about 
the existence of particular needy and helpless human infants at a particular 
time, and surely doing so triggers a special duty of care for the welfare of the 
dependent beings one has created. Seeing this is compatible with placing 
voluntary childbearing in a broader context in which we all have duties to 
contribute to population increase.
What holds true in a four-person world can also hold true in a world 
already populated with billions of people. Again, I don’t presume to be 
in possession of a satisfactory population ethics principle or suite of 
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principles. 10 Any of a range of principles will yield the plausible implication 
that the population of the Earth, given present circumstances, ought to 
increase. Also, suppose that the right population ethics calls for population 
stabilization not increase in our circumstances. Carrying out this mandate 
might still lead to the circumstance that triggers the duty of procreators to 
absorb costs of procreation and pass none of them along to nonprocreators 
according to Casal and Williams. Again, those who bring about births 
necessary for stabilization are still fulfilling a collective duty, and their acts 
trigger duties falling on nonprocreators, on the view this essay proposes. 11 
The claim then is that the voluntary procreator whose childbearing and 
childrearing incurs costs we all must share is relevantly unlike the polluter 
who acts for his own purposes in ways that impose spillover harms on others. 
He is more like the voluntary rescuer when a person in peril is threatened 
with drowning and many persons might come to the rescue. His act helps 
to fulfill a duty we all owe and we all have duties to help carry through the 
fulfillment. 12 Either the rescue effort itself, or the cost of reimbursing those 
who bear special risk or expense, might impose costs on nonrescuers, but 
these are costs that nonrescuers are morally obligated to bear, up to some 
point. Same goes for nonprocreators.
2.2. Case Two: Procreation Brings Gains to Nonprocreators
Turn now to case two. Suppose some people voluntarily chose to have 
children —again we are supposing this occurs against the backdrop of an 
initially fair distribution of resources— and nonprocreators gain spillover 
benefits. In resource egalitarian terms, which we are here not challenging, 
the addition of new people to the world brings it about that there are more 
resources for everybody. In another terminology, bringing children into 
the world, in some circumstances, generates positive externalities that fall 
on others, including nonprocreators. In this scenario, do nonprocreators 
have some duty to assist with costs of childbearing and childraising that is 
10. For a useful introduction to population ethics issues, see Broome 2004.
11. I do not deny that in some circumstances adding people to the world will be morally 
wrong according to a reasonable population ethics. In this case procreators might be wronging 
nonprocreators by imposing unfair costs on them. But whether this is so depends on the shape 
of the collective duty we all share, in some circumstances, to bring about population decrease. 
It might turn out that nonprocreators have not done all that they ought to do, to facilitate 
population decrease, so the mere fact that Alf has been directly responsible for adding a child 
to the world, when this outcome is morally undesirable, does not by itself establish that Alf has 
wronged nonprocreating bystanders. 
12. I assume that Casal and Williams would agree that if there is a duty to procreate that falls in 
one way or another on all of us, that duty might generate obligations on the part of nonprocreators to 
assist in the childrearing and resource provision for children that voluntary procreators are morally 
required to give their children. They will disagree that there is any such duty.
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triggered by their receipt of these external benefits, on the assumption that 
they neither asked for nor consented to the imposition of these benefits?
This question calls to mind the Hart-Rawls principle of fairness, which 
holds that “when a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous 
cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty in ways 
necessary to yield advantages to all, those who have submitted to these 
restrictions have a right to similar acquiescence on the part of those who 
have benefited from their submission”. 13 The idea is that when procreation 
and childrearing are correctly regarded as a cooperative practice that fits 
this characterization, the cooperating behavior of the participants generates 
duties of reciprocity and fair play that fall on those who are recipients of 
benefits. As Rawls remarks, “We are not to gain from the cooperative labors 
of others without doing our fair share” (Rawls 1999: 96).
Casal and Williams do not deny that obligations can arise from the Hart-
Rawls principle of fairness. But they interpret the principle in a way that 
restricts its applicability. In this connection we might consider doubts about 
how obligations might arise under Hart-Rawls raised in separate discussions 
by Robert Nozick and A. John Simmons. 14 Roughly, the idea is that those who 
incur obligations to cooperators under the Hart-Rawls principle must either 
voluntarily accept the benefits of the scheme or at least be willing to accept 
benefits voluntarily if voluntary acceptance were possible. Mere receipt of 
benefits does not suffice to obligate. Also, those to whom duties are owed 
under Hart-Rawls must be intending to benefit others by their cooperative 
actions undertaken under a fair scheme of rules. Merely acting in ways 
that happen to benefit others does not suffice to generate obligations of 
reciprocity to repay. Along a similar line, Casal and Williams say “the principle 
concerns nonexcludable goods that are produced by cooperative activity in 
which individuals bear some cost, which they would not otherwise bear, in 
order to produce the good”. (Casal and Williams 2004: 159).
Casal and Williams anyway hold that in our world, procreation and 
childrearing as actually practiced do not meet the conditions of the Hart-
Rawls principle of fairness suitably interpreted. Hence, procreative activities 
do not give rise to obligations on the part of nonprocreators to bear a share 
of the costs of childrearing and fair provisioning of children with resources 
as they become responsible adult citizens.
In response, the first point to note is that if there is a collective duty to 
expand or sustain population and individual duties flow from that collective 
duty, then in the case in which the childbearing and childrearing activities 
13. Cited from Nozick 1974: 90.
14. See Nozick 1974, 90-95; also Simmons 1979, chapter 5; also Simmons’s contribution 
to Simmons and Wellman 2005. For defense of the principle of fairness, see Arneson 1992; 
Arneson 2013.
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of procreators confer external benefits on others, the requirement falling 
on recipients of these benefits to do more to assist in the child production 
enterprise in virtue of this receipt of benefits holds whether or not the 
conditions of the Hart-Rawls principle of fairness apply. Returning to the 
analogy with rescue cases, suppose some people undertake a rescue in 
circumstances in which all of us, including me, bear some responsibility for 
undertaking rescue and sharing its costs. Suppose the rescue effort happens 
to shower benefits on some bystanders, who are themselves obligated to 
share the costs of the rescue. The receipt of benefits alters what qualifies 
as the fair cost sharing arrangement. If some in the group of those who are 
snared in the web of collective obligation to bring about rescue happen to 
gain side effect benefits and others similarly obligated do not, those who 
benefit should pay a greater share of the overall cost of the rescue operation 
and those who do not so benefit should pay less. 
Nonetheless, I hold that the childbearing and childrearing enterprise 
in many communities does qualify as a cooperative practice satisfying 
the conditions of the Hart-Rawls principle and so triggering obligations of 
reciprocity to contribute one’s fair share. 
First point: if other conditions are met, mere receipt of benefits 
can sometimes suffice to trigger obligations. Some goods provided via 
cooperative schemes are nonoptional with respect to a group of people: if 
anyone in the group consumes any benefits, everyone must consume some 
benefits. 15 When nonoptional benefits are delivered by cooperation, one 
need not voluntarily accept benefits in order to become obligated to pay 
one’s fair share. Nor need one’s will be disposed to voluntary acceptance if 
that were possible. Casal and Williams cite Ronald Dworkin as criticizing 
versions of the principle of fair play that assume that “people can incur 
obligations simply by receiving what they do not seek and would reject if 
they had the chance”. Dworkin comments, “This seems unreasonable”. 16 
Casal and Williams do not definitely embrace whatever amendment of the 
principle Dworkin’s claim seems to suggest. I would definitely deny that we 
15. There are further distinctions that need to be drawn here. Sometimes if any members 
of a group consume any of a good, all must consume the same amount of it. Here the  good just 
falls on people and there is no choice whether or not to consume it. Sometimes all must consume 
some if any group members consume some, but a different amount of the good might fall on 
different group members—again, all of this happening in the absence of anyone’s voluntary 
choice as to how much to consume. In still other cases even though a good is nonoptional for 
members of a group, how much of the good each individual consumes is up to that individual. 
In this last case, the extent of one’s obligation to help pay for the good may depend on how 
much one chooses to consume (“may depend”, because consumption may be nonrival, and 
one’s choice to consume may be just a decision to avoid waste, in the context of a scheme that 
is not worth its costs and should cease to exist). These complications do not affect any claim I 
urge in this essay.
16. Dworkin 1986:194 (cited after Casal and Williams 2004: 168).
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should endorse the Dworkin criticism as stated in the first instance. Suppose 
a cooperative practice is operating that provides national defense for the 
community you inhabit. Suppose you have false empirical beliefs, and do 
not see that the national defense practice really does provide you genuine 
benefits, worth their cost, in a scheme whose costs are fairly apportioned. 
Your subjective disbelief that you benefit does not obviate your obligation 
to contribute under the scheme. The same holds, I would say, if your error 
is moral rather than factual. Suppose you have misguided pacifist views and 
believe benefiting by threat of violence under any circumstance is wrong. 
Nonetheless, the threat of violence that maintenance of national defense 
involves is in fact morally right and you do in fact benefit, and benefit from 
a morally acceptable practice that is fair. I say, in these circumstances, you 
have an obligation to contribute, indeed an enforceable obligation, which 
your subjective opinion to the contrary does not obviate.
Suppose that the production-of-children practice does in fact confer 
benefits on me, and the benefits are worth the cost, and the costs are fairly 
apportioned by the rules of the practice. Suppose also that at least some of 
the benefits provided are nonoptional. Just by living in the society, I cannot 
avoid receipt of benefits. These circumstances do not yet suffice to establish 
that obligations arise under Hart-Rawls. The enterprise must be a cooperative 
venture, fairly organized, and the cooperators must be intending by their 
activity to be conferring the benefits of the scheme on others. Also, the 
cooperators must be incurring costs under the arrangements. The objection 
then insists that these further conditions are not satisfied.
There is an interesting question raised here, which this essay will not 
seek to answer. The question is what obligations if any arise in situations in 
which some but not all of the Hart-Rawls conditions are met. For example, 
suppose that the conditions of the Hart-Rawls principle of fairness are 
satisfied, except that the “cooperators” don’t think of themselves as acting 
to benefit others, but if the fact that their efforts do spread benefits widely 
through the community were brought to their attention, they would find this 
welcome news, and acquire an intention so to benefit the others. We might 
call these people latent cooperators. Do their latently cooperative activities 
generate obligations in those who benefit from their efforts to pay a share of 
their costs? I suspect the answer is “Yes” but will not pursue the issue here. 
I simply contend that the plain unvarnished conditions of the Hart-Rawls 
principle, rightly understood, are standardly satisfied by participants in 
child production practices, so given that these practices shower benefits on 
others in the neighborhood, the obligations of reciprocity that the fair play 
principle generates here are triggered.
One issue is whether participants in the practice are acting to benefit 
others. I grant that people who either have sex with the aim of having 
children or who have sex and then make a decision to bring the fetus to 
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term when it is discovered that a pregnancy has started normally act in 
the expectation that raising children will enrich their lives and make the 
decision for this reason. But there is normally another element in play. 
People decide to have children for self-fulfillment, but this is a moralized 
notion of self-fulfillment. Procreators think that their childrearing activities 
will significantly enhance the community in which they live, and they are 
also aware, perhaps in a somewhat inchoate or vague way, that there is a 
duty to be fruitful and multiply that falls on their community and is one 
that their procreative choices help to fulfill. People’s motives are mixed, but 
that does not preclude their having the motivations that are conditions for 
Hart-Rawls to apply. After all, many who volunteer to contribute to national 
defense, the paradigm of a cooperative scheme to which Hart-Rawls applies, 
have mixed motives and aim in part at their own self-fulfillment, through 
meaningful work or glory seeking or the like.
Here is a relevant comparison. Take the standard example of a public 
goods provision scheme that generates duties under the principle of fairness. 
Bandits periodically menace peaceful farmers living near each other in a 
narrow valley. Some farmers initiate a protection system. Valley dwellers are 
to take turns standing sentry duty each night, which will reduce the losses 
of all to predatory bandits. Suppose some people really hate standing sentry 
duty, some don’t mind, some fancy the activity even though it is risky. So a fair 
and tolerably efficient scheme for distributing the burdens of the protection 
scheme might involve asking for volunteers, and then if the number of 
individuals who volunteer is adequate, requiring other valley inhabitants 
to pay into a fund that compensates the volunteer sentries for their noble 
activity and provides special health care benefits to sentries injured on duty, 
etc. The sheer fact that people volunteer to supply the needed public good 
(partly for altruistic, partly for self-interested motives) does not negate the 
moral appeal of the claim that others who benefit from their activities on 
behalf of the community owe them compensation.
Someone might object that if people voluntarily act in ways that 
benefit themselves and spill benefits also on others, without any offer of 
compensation, no compensation to them is owed—and this is the situation 
of procreators vis-à-vis benefiting others. In reply: Under the Hart-Rawls 
principle of fairness reasonably interpreted, obligations can arise on the part 
of those who benefit from cooperative schemes that shower nonoptional 
benefits on a group of people (or for that matter on those who voluntarily 
seek and get optional benefits from such a public goods delivery system), 
even if the cooperators are net beneficiaries from the scheme in the absence 
of contributions from nonparticipant beneficiaries. The cooperators who 
gain on balance in this way can still be unfairly treated by the free riders, 
and the scheme can be made more fair in its distribution of benefits and 
burdens if nonparticipant beneficiaries are required to pay a fair share. 
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(What constitutes “fair shares” is a topic not addressed in this essay.) 
I grant that procreators normally expect their lives to be improved, in 
prudential terms, by having and raising children. Nonetheless, procreators 
also expect to bear some costs they would prefer to avoid, or lessen, if they 
could, despite their expectation of overall gain. And procreators recognize 
that in deciding to have children they are inevitably making a risky choice, 
that if things go badly might result in large-scale disruption or degradation of 
their lives. When children turn out badly, even through no fault or oversight 
of the parents, the parents’ lives can be blighted, pretty much destroyed. I 
submit that these generally applicable characterizations of the decision to 
have and raise children suffice to satisfy the condition of sacrifice incurred 
by cooperators that is required for the Hart-Rawls principle to apply. 
Readers may wonder what benefits unavoidably fall on nonprocreators 
arising from the childrearing efforts of parents in their society. These vary. 
Some are highly local. Only those living nearby get the benefit of seeing your 
children gamboling along the street. Some are widely diffused. All people 
benefit, as they age, from reinvigoration of the culture as a result of the 
creativity of youth, and of stimulus to the economy from the energy and 
ambition of the young. 17
One might raise another worry. The Hart-Rawls principle of fairness 
stipulates that obligations arise, given certain conditions, when people 
participate together in a mutually cooperative venture according to rules 
and others receive benefits from the scheme. Is the production-of-children 
practice sensibly regarded as carried out according to rules? Yes. In a just 
society, laws and social norms stipulate what those who contribute to and 
benefit from childbearing and childrearing owe to one another. There are 
recognized expectations. In a state of nature, the rules are more inchoate, 
and essentially consist of the recognized duty to procreate according to 
population ethics along with the principle of fairness and a sensible range of 
interpretations of the duties and obligations thereby generated. 
The preceding scrappy remarks have tried to support the idea that 
nonprocreators have obligations to procreators in a wide range of 
circumstances. Your bringing about the birth of a child generates obligations 
17. In an interesting essay, Serena Olsaretti raises doubts as to whether obligations to share 
the costs of having children arise under Hart-Rawls along the lines I have urged. My discussion 
in the text answers these doubts. She makes a further suggestion: that as modern societies are 
actually organized, significant benefits of parenting are coercively channeled to nonparents, 
as when children are taxed to pay for old age assistance programs and other elements of the 
modern welfare state. This sounds plausible. However, I worry that critics might respond that 
in an ideally just society, these arrangements would be made on a pay as you go basis, and 
there would not be forcible takings of the sort she highlights. For example, each generation 
could save for its own future, and use the proceeds to purchase goods needed in old age. See 
Olsaretti 2013. 
22 Richard J. Arneson
LEAP 2 (2014)
in bystanders to help in the upbringing of the child.
 Whatever we owe to procreators and children generally, we owe more to 
procreators who are poor and to children born into poverty. 18 To return again 
to the rescue analogy: if there is a drowning threat on a beach filled with 
people, a few people undertake the necessary rescue of those who are in peril, 
and the rescuers then turn out to be especially vulnerable and incur large costs 
in the course of the rescue, or turn out to need extra help in order to complete 
the rescue effort successfully, the bystanders have an extra obligation to 
compensate the rescuers who have sustained great loss and especially to 
assist these would-be rescuers in bring their rescue efforts to success.
A wide variety of approaches to social justice will converge on the 
judgment that we owe more to worse off (as compared to better off) 
members of society who are engaged in childbearing and childrearing. 
Under a wide range of circumstances, utilitarian, egalitarian, sufficientarian, 
and prioritarian views will affirm this judgment.
I want to focus on the subset of poor children and poor adult family 
members who are also low in the ensemble of personal traits that constitute 
native ability. 19 Some poor children and their guardians are below average 
in bank account wealth and income but blessed with high levels of talent. 
Some are cursed with low talent endowments. (Ability is multifaceted 
and multidimensional, but I suppose some are poorly endowed all things 
considered; for simplicity let’s just speak of those with low talent.) With luck 
and pluck the impoverished people with low ability may end up leading 
great lives, but they are surely likely to be clustered among the people who 
end up badly off in overall lifetime well-being.
A further point is perhaps worth noting. Our duties to poor people likely 
include a duty to provide them a fair opportunity to become parents and 
successfully raise children. This duty applies with special force to the subset 
of poor individuals with low marketable skills.
Parenting is meaningful and creative work. (Of course, it is also drudgery 
and frustration; that does not undermine the claim just stated.) The parent 
has the duty to form the child’s character, to shape the lumpish infant into 
a particular person. This is in some respects a creative, artistic task, like 
painting a picture or making a sculpture, with the special twist that from 
the very beginning the material on which one is doing the creating is a 
conscious human with agency interests of its own, which gradually come to 
include interests in self-making and self-determination. It is as though you 
18. See Bou-Habib 2012. 
19. For an interesting defense of the view that in determining people’s fundamental 
political status and political entitlements a duty of opacity respect is owed all agents above 
a threshold of rational agency capacity, and that opacity respect requires us to refrain from 
assessing or measuring individuals’ agency capacities, see Carter 2012. 
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were trying to paint a work of art on a canvas that had arms and hands of 
its own that were clasping paint brushes, and the canvas arms were making 
their own strokes and painting over your brush strokes —not to mention 
that there are many other forces besides your artistic efforts that are shaping 
the outcome of the process, including some deliberate painting by other 
people’s hands. Moreover, the canvas arms gradually become more adept 
and eventually take over the process, if you are successful.
For many poor people, and especially for those who suffer the double 
burden of being born into below-average wealth and being born with a 
weak endowment of native talent potential, raising a child will be their best 
option for meaningful and creative work. This will be brutally true under 
circumstances of injustice, but we should entertain the possibility that a 
potentially tolerably just society might generate a distribution of income 
and wealth and a distribution of labor market opportunities that give some 
individuals meager prospects. If such a society is to qualify as tolerably 
just, the opportunities of those with below-average prospects must be 
good enough, and surely must include opportunities for meaningful and 
creative tasks. There will then be a special obligation to encourage people 
to undertake childrearing by making sure they have reasonable prospects of 
being successful parents if they do choose this life path.
This line of thought is strengthened by the further consideration that 
parenting requires a different set of capacities than most kinds of creative 
and challenging work that positions in the market economy provide, 
especially those that are available to those with low marketable skills a the 
bottom of the economic heap. A caring, loving disposition, attentiveness and 
persistence, and some common sense will go a long way toward making one 
a good parent, especially in the crucial early years of a child’s life. (Agencies 
other than parents can help foster autonomy and sophisticated skills in  older 
children.) Parenting tends to be an accessible form of meaningful work. So 
a just society that provides adequate opportunities for meaningful work 
for all its members will be careful to provide, within the mix of meaningful 
work options made available to poor individuals, good opportunities to be 
successful parents. 20 
Much that should be done to help poor (that is, nonaffluent) parents to 
be successful as parents involves familiar welfare-state measures. We should 
channel public funds for public education to ensure high quality primary and 
secondary education along with avenues to higher education for children 
of poor parents. We should provide high-quality day-care that is available 
to children of the working poor, to help parents combine paid employment 
20. I don’t deny that a just society in some circumstances might restrict rights to have children 
and provide fair opportunities for meaningful work to its members in other ways. For example, 
consider scenarios of severe overpopulation and a drastic need to reduce the birth rate.
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and parenting. We should regulate labor markets to bring about decent 
employment prospects for individuals with small income and wealth and 
weak marketable skills, if necessary setting up the state as decent employer 
of last resort (see Arneson 1990). We should set income tax policy so that 
individuals with below-average marketable skills are rewarded for seeking 
and sustaining paid employment and paying self-employment. We should 
facilitate adult education that develops improved parenting skills. I suggest 
that in addition the state should be encouraging people to form marriage (or 
other long-term stable relationships) that make parenting easier by sharing 
its burdens and for that matter encouraging people, especially men, to 
regard sustained commitment to parenting as a valuable life option. 
3.  MARRIAGE PROMOTION, STATE NEUTRALITY, AND 
MARRIAGE ABOLITIONISM
One might first of all object that the state simply has no business interfering 
in the decisions of sane adults regarding living alone, cohabitating, marrying, 
or divorcing. The proper functions of the state do not include regulation 
of people’s friendships and romantic lives. The state has a proper interest 
in securing an adequate upbringing for all children, but this job can and 
should be done without wrongly interfering in people’s private lives. In a 
diverse society marked by reasonable pluralism of belief, people will differ in 
their views on sex, romance, marriage, living alone versus living cohabiting 
versus living communally with several adults, and so on. 21 So the state 
should be strictly neutral on this broad issue, neither promoting marriage 
nor discouraging it. 22
This is in some ways an appealing stance, but notice that if you adopt it, 
you would seem to be committed to opposing the contemporary movement 
in some contemporary societies (for example, the U.S.) to establish the legal 
right for same-sex couples to marry and have the legal privileges of marriage 
that are restricted to opposite-sex couples in many jurisdictions. (You could 
still accept as a demand of non-ideal justice that if there is legal establishment 
of marriage, the status ought to be equally open to couples of both orientations, 
without being committed to legal establishment of marriage.) The normatively 
compelling position would be to abolish the legal status of marriage as a state-
protected legal status for anyone, of whatever sexual orientation.
The counterargument against marriage abolitionism is that a long-term 
committed romantic relationship, combining friendship, sex, and the building 
of a life together, is a valuable achievement, and the official recognition of this 
21. The invocation of reasonable pluralism of belief is claimed to support state neutrality 
on the good. See Rawls 1996; also Quong 2010.
22. This view is vigorously advanced in Brake 2012.
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type of commitment by the state is a reasonable, noncoercive encouragement 
to people to attempt this achievement. The goods to be had thereby can 
equally well be obtained in same-sex and opposite-sex relationships, and the 
achievement toward which the marital status aspires is equally valuable no 
matter what the sexual orientation of those attaining it. Hence there should 
be no discrimination between same-sex and opposite-sex relationships 
in the state’s policy of marriage recognition and endorsement, and this 
recognition and endorsement are preferable to a hands-off neutral policy, if 
the state’s policy of putting a thumb on the scale in favor of marriage is likely 
to bring it about that people are better off and the gains of the gainers are not 
brought about unfairly at the expense of any losers. The point here is that to 
defend same-sex marriage rights rather than abolition of state recognition of 
marriage, one needs to argue that long-term relationships are instrumentally 
and noninstrumentally good for people and that society should foster what 
is good for people. In a slogan, one needs to oppose state neutrality on the 
good. I suggest we ought not be marriage abolitionists.
(Although the discussion above refers to same-sex and opposite 
sex couples, nothing hangs on the fact that the group of adults seeking 
recognition of their pledge to long-term commitment consists of exactly two 
people. Larger groups might well form similar bonds and seek the same type 
of recognition.)
The condition that the state should recognize and endorse marriage on 
the ground that people gain overall only if gains and losses are not unfairly 
divided is nontrivial. Some people will do better living alone, or living with 
their parents or other close relatives, or cohabiting in shifting groups. Is 
favoring marriage disfavoring them? In many countries in recent years, your 
chances of getting married and staying married vary with your income. The 
poor do it less and stick with it less than the nonpoor. Heaping subsidies on 
marriage might be unfair to the poor.
Here a comparison might be made to recreational drug prohibitions. 
Suppose the state bans the recreational consumption of methamphetamine, 
cocaine, and heroin on paternalistic grounds. Such a policy must confront 
the fact that some citizens are no doubt hurt not helped by the legal ban. 
Ideally there should be different legal policies for people who would benefit 
from having these drugs available and for those who would be harmed, but 
such a legal regime may be unfeasible. If gainers gain enough and losers lose 
little enough, the ban may be roughly fair, and understanding this, all should 
abide by it. Much the same might be true of state policies encouraging 
romantic involvement and in particular long-term committed romantic 
involvement. The policies might be roughly fair on balance despite the fact 
that they produce winners and losers.
A significant residual difficulty is that hard drug prohibitions might well 
impose especially hard burdens on the poor who violate the prohibitions 
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and are then more likely to be exposed to onerous legal penalties than 
nonpoor violators. In the same way, marriage promotion policies will benefit 
some and hurt others, but among those who end up disfavored, those who 
are poor will be more likely than nonpoor to be grievously afflicted. If those 
disfavored in these ways will tend to be the worse off among the worse off, 
difficult tradeoff issues arise. A policy that helps the worse off may be bad for 
the worse off segment of the worse off. Depending on the costs and benefits 
and the numbers of people involved, a morally sensitive cost and benefit 
calculation might sometimes yield the judgment that an instance of this 
sort of hard tradeoff is acceptable all things considered. But surely in our 
public policy choices we should seek ways of avoiding kicking those who are 
already down.
In considering the desirability from a social justice standpoint of 
pronatalist and pro-marriage public policies, we need to be considering 
not simply what is desirable from the standpoint of an adult person who 
is poor, but also what is good for poor children. This section has suggested 
that promoting stable romantic commitment might be fair on balance in its 
effects on adults even if the policies produce some winners and some losers. 
The consideration of children’s interests complicates the picture. 
4. MARRIAGE PROMOTION AND CHILDREARING ASSISTANCE
In several contemporary societies, single-parent households are increasing, 
especially among the poor. There is evidence that children are likely to fare 
better in stable two-parent (or two-guardian) households, and that poverty 
exacerbates whatever problems for children growing up in a single-parent 
household involves. There is also some evidence that growing up in a single-
parent household, with a female as lone parent, creates more difficulties for 
boys than for girls (Autor and Wasserman 2013). So perhaps the state ought 
to be discouraging childbearing and childrearing among people, mostly 
women, who are likely to end up in single-parent households? I suggest the 
answer is No, but the issues are tricky, even murky.
When two individuals not involved in a stable relationship produce a child, 
it is not axiomatic that marrying the man who got you pregnant is a good 
idea, for you or the child. When a marriage is conflictual, it is not obvious that 
staying together and fighting is better for the children in the household than 
separating and divorcing. Working class single-parent mothers in the U.S. are 
more likely than their European counterparts to marry, but they are also more 
likely to divorce and cohabit again and perhaps remarry again. As a sociologist 
studying U.S. marital patterns has put it, we have in the U.S. a “marriage-go-
round”. (Cherlin 2010) Moreover, working class women in the U.S. are more 
likely than their European counterparts to form nonlasting cohabitation 
arrangements—the partner-go-round. For children, the evidence is that 
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unstable household arrangements during early childhood years are stressful 
for children and interfere with healthy development.
How should public policy tilt? Providing financial incentives to marry might 
exacerbate the marriage-go-round. Providing financial incentives that encourage 
stable marriage might pressure women to stay in abusive relationships.
One might be tempted by the thought that policies that discourage poor 
women from having children when they cannot reasonably foresee a stable 
household arrangement with two or more dedicated adults playing parental 
roles for their children, if they were successful, would reduce the incidence 
of single-parent households, a desirable outcome for children. 23
If poor women are less prone than their wealthier counterparts to form 
stable companionate partnerships, and policies enacted to discourage 
single-parenting would deter some from having children, that outcome 
should strike us as harsh. For a very large number of prime-age adults, being 
successful at childrearing is a great part of their good. For many adults, 
the job of childrearing is the most interesting, rewarding, challenging, and 
creative work they have the opportunity to perform. As discussed in section 
two of this essay, this is more likely to be the case for poor adults, whose 
labor market options are meager. 
There are better alternatives to discouraging childrearing on the part 
of an adult who would be living alone. We should be trying to help poor 
individuals who want to be parents to succeed in this role rather than to 
discourage them from undertaking it. 24 This is compatible with encouraging 
stable cohabitation. Also, since men can benefit from successful parenting as 
well as women, we should be seeking sensible policies that encourage poor 
men to want to take on childrearing roles and help them succeed in these 
tasks. There is an element of “the hat makes the man “ here. If I take on a 
responsible role, I am more likely to become committed to it and personally 
identified with it, and more likely to function as a responsible role-player. We 
need to seek policies that will induce the man to put on the hat.
The weakening of marriage among working-class people in current 
times is not mysterious. Compared to earlier times, in our time the benefits 
of marriage for working-class adults are less and the costs of not getting 
23. This is a theme of political conservatives in the U.S. See for example the collected 
works of Charles Murray (1984; 2012).
24. There is a tradeoff here. Individuals vary in their capacities for good parenting, and 
vary in how propitious their circumstances are for this social role, and some individuals (rich 
and poor!) should be discouraged from assuming a childrearing role, even under ideally 
supportive social conditions. This is consistent with maintaining that generally speaking, 
people, especially the poor, should be encouraged both to take on the parental role and to form 
stable family-type relationships, for their sakes and for the sake of the children they will raise, 
and that those among the poor who have weak parental skills should be helped and supported 
so that their parenting ventures are successful.
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married are less. For starters, men are less marriageable. They offer less in 
economic security terms, and women now have other options for securing 
their economic well-being. 
A familiar feature of contemporary economic life is that economies are 
hollowing out, with fewer good jobs for the uneducated and increasing 
rewards to those with higher education credentials at the level of college 
degrees and beyond. In the U.S., “by 1996, the average thirty-year old 
husband with a high school degree earned 20 percent less than a comparable 
man in 1979” (Cherlin 2010: 163). Increasing assortative mating in marriage 
patterns increases the strains on poor and near-poor people seeking mates. 
“The winners in the new economy are marrying each other and consolidating 
their gains” (Cherlin 2010: 179; see also Esping-Anderson 2009: 59-70).
We should assume that these trends will continue for the foreseeable 
future. In that case, what strategies make sense for poor adults starting out in 
life? What preparation and —to the extent this might be effective— guidance 
might society provide them to cope with the world they will face, and what 
forms of help will facilitate their succeeding in their life aims?
Men with a high school education or less will not offer particularly attractive 
economic prospects to prospective mates. If these men are predominantly 
oriented to seeking short-term gratification with male buddies, they won’t 
appear, or be, good candidates for the role of loving partner in intimate 
relationships. A feminization of their socialization would render them more 
companionable, more cohabitable, and more marriageable. Even if my job 
prospects are bleak, if I have serious nonwork interests that I care about 
and that make me interesting, if I want long-term friendship on egalitarian 
terms with someone with whom I will also build an intimate stable romantic 
relationship, and if my life plans are open to the possibility of committing 
time and energy into childrearing, I look more credible in the eyes of someone 
seeking a stable romantic partner. Labor force attachment helps as well. If it is 
just not in the cards that I will be a good traditional breadwinner, at least I can 
be a stable, rather than erratically intermittent, crumb-winner.
In interviews, high school educated U.S. women report that they have 
the same life goals as their more educated and wealthy sisters. In a potential 
mate they seek economic security, intimate friendship, and cooperative 
faithfulness. Perhaps the “realistic utopian” aspiration for high school 
educated women would be to find the latter two of the three, and be happy 
with that. Of course, economic insecurity tends to erode one’s capacities 
for intimacy and loyalty. (I assume that in a just society the distribution 
of income and wealth can be unequal, but the human cost of economic 
insecurity that falls on the poor surely affects the degree to which justice 
requires distributive arrangements that eliminate or cushion that insecurity.)
I have been speaking of people seeking heterosexual partnerships, but 
there are other sorts. If women’s sexuality is more labile than men’s, women 
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potentially have the option of choosing to orient sexually toward women and 
seek female long-term romantic mates and childrearing partners. Or at least, 
they have the option to the degree that their culture does not wrongfully rule 
out this option as socially taboo. (I assume men are more likely to be stuck 
with whatever sexual orientation is planted in their genes.)
If more stable partnership arrangements would be good for people, 
the simplest way in which social arrangements can facilitate successful 
partnerships among the poor is by providing generous financial assistance to 
people who are making serious efforts to fashion a good life for themselves. 
That probably would involve income supplements conditional on labor 
force attachment. Such income assistance would ease the ever-present 
grinding strain of hovering on the edge of poverty or being engulfed in it that 
wears down people’s attempts to make lasting loving relationships.
Society could also be generous, rather than stingy, in the educational 
opportunities provided to children of less educated and economically 
marginal parents. Better teachers, a longer school day, high quality preschool 
instruction for very young children, a longer school year, flexible after-school 
child care, all targeted at poor children, would help the recipients and also 
help their parents fulfill their important life goal of being successful parents 
(Waldfogel 2006). And completing the circle, education of all children, not 
only the children of the poor, should include a didactic character-forming 
component. Think of life skills classes that essentially amount to cognitive 
behavioral therapy —here are the circumstances you can expect to encounter 
in your future life, here are the difficulties and challenges you will face, 
what goals do you have and anticipate having and what personal skills and 
traits will you need to achieve them? This is what I have in mind under the 
heading of the feminization of socialization, insofar as we are considering 
the schooling of men.
Regarding state support to the parenting efforts of poor parents, a delicate 
dance is needed. On the one hand, society should help parents succeed at 
parenting, for their sake and for the sake of their children. On the other hand, 
some nonwealthy parents (some wealthy parents too, but that points to 
other issues) are ineffective parents, and channeling aid to children entirely 
through their incompetent parents is not an effective strategy for helping 
children at risk. 25 Yet helping poor children in ways that bypass their parents 
can undermine these parents’ authority and self-confidence and decrease 
their ability to steer their children’s lives for the better. To some extent one 
wants to structure aid to children so that from a very early age they are 
exposed to authority figures (other than parents) who are visibly working 
for their benefit and worthy of their trust and emulation. In pre-school and 
25. This is one lesson that might be drawn from Mayer 1997.
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school and day-care centers, though children’s peers will probably make a 
larger imprint on their socialization than their teachers, good teachers can be 
part-time substitute parents and significant role models. Same goes for the 
nurse or social worker who makes regular state-sponsored visits to troubled 
family homes. There is no contradiction in pursuing goals that, in actual 
circumstances, partially conflict. One seeks to advance the ensemble of the 
worthy pertinent policy goals appropriately weighted so that one can discern 
which to pursue more vigorously and to what degree in cases of conflict.
5. CONCLUSION
In this essay I argue that given population ethics obligations that fall on all 
of us collectively, we owe assistance to procreators in providing a fair start in 
life to their children, even on the assumption of an initially fair distribution 
of resources. We also owe people a fair opportunity to be successful parents. I 
suggest a perspective for determining what shape and form of public policies 
these obligations press us to endorse. The perspective assumes that what we 
one another depends on what is intrinsically good, what constitutes a better 
as opposed to a worse quality of life for the individual living it. I support 
the perspective largely by illustrating how it would structure deliberation of 
public policy.
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